How do we know that when one is unaware engaged in sacrifices, (1) it [the sacrifice] is invalid? Because it says, And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord, (2) [which intimates] that the killing must be for the sake of the bullock. (3) We know this, (4) said he to him, [but] how do we know that [awareness] is indispensable? (5) Ye shall slaughter it with your will, (6) said he, [which teaches,] slaughter it with your knowledge. (7) SINCE THE INTENTION IS DETERMINED ONLY BY THE CELEBRANT. Our Mishnah does not agree with the following Tanna. For it was taught, R. Eleazar son of R. Jose said: I have heard that the owner [of the sacrifice] renders [it] piggul! (8) Raba said: What is R. Eleazar son of R. Jose's reason? Because Scripture says, Then shall he that offereth [his offering] present [unto the Lord, etc.] (9) Abaye said: R. Eleazar son of R. Jose, R. Eliezer and R. Simeon b. Eleazar all hold that when one expresses an intention while another performs the act, (10) it is an [effective] intention. R. Eleazar son of R. Jose: this [view] that we have stated. (11) R. Eliezer: as we learnt: If one slaughters for a heathen, his shechitah is fit; but R. Eliezer declares it unfit. (12) R. Simeon b. Eleazar: as it was taught: R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated a general rule: That which is not fit to put away, and such is not [generally] put away, yet it did become fit to a certain person (13) and he did put it away, and then another came and carried it out, the latter is rendered liable through the former's intention. (14) Now, both of them (15) agree with R. Eleazar son of R. Jose: if we say [thus] without, is there a question about within? (16) R. Eleazar son of R. Jose does not agree with the other two: perhaps he ruled thus only [in reference to] within, but not [in reference to] without. (17) R. Simeon b. Eleazar agrees with R. Eliezer: if we say [thus] in connection with the Sabbath, is there a question about idolatry? (18) R. Eleazar does not agree with R. Simeon b. Eleazar: perhaps you rule thus only in connection with idolatry, because it is similar to ‘within’; (19) but in the case of the Sabbath, the Torah interdicted only a considered labour. (20) MISHNAH. WHICH IS THE PLACE [FOR THE RITES] OF SACRIFICES? THE SLAUGHTERING OF SACRIFICES OF THE HIGHER SANCTITY IS AT THE NORTH [SIDE OF THE ALTAR]. THE SLAUGHTERING OF THE BULLOCK AND THE HE-GOAT OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT IS [DONE] AT THE NORTH, AND THE RECEPTION OF THEIR BLOOD IS [PERFORMED] WITH SERVICE VESSELS AT THE NORTH, AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES SPRINKLING BETWEEN THE STAVES [OF THE ARK], ON THE VEIL, AND ON THE GOLDEN ALTAR; [THE OMISSION OF] A SINGLE APPLICATION OF THESE INVALIDATES [THE CEREMONY]. THE RESIDUE OF THE BLOOD HE [THE PRIEST] POURED OUT ON THE WESTERN BASE OF THE OUTER ALTAR, BUT IF HE DID NOT POUR IT OUT, HE DID NOT INVALIDATE [THE SACRIFICE]. AS FOR THE BULLOCKS WHICH WERE BURNT (21) AND THE HE-GOATS WHICH WERE BURNT, (22) THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS [DONE] AT THE NORTH, AND THE RECEPTION OF THEIR BLOOD IS [DONE] AT THE NORTH, AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES SPRINKLING BETWEEN THE STAVES [OF THE ARK], ON THE VEIL, AND ON THE GOLDEN ALTAR;

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(1). ↑ He slaughters a sacrifice, but without such intention.
(2). ↑ Lev. I, 5.
(3). ↑ I.e., he must intend to kill a sacred animal as a sacrifice.
(4). ↑ Lit. ‘this is in our hands’.
(5). ↑ In the sense that the sacrifice is otherwise invalid. The text quoted may merely teach that intention is required, but not that the sacrifice is invalid in default thereof.
(6). ↑ Lev. XIX, 5. This is the literal translation. E.V.: Ye shall offer it that ye may be accepted.
(7). ↑ With the knowledge that it is a sacrifice. Thus this refutes the teaching of Lev. I, 5, and it shows that such awareness is indispensable.
(8). ↑ While the priest was performing its rites.
(9). ↑ Num. XV, 4. Lit. translation. Thus the owner is called ‘he that offereth’, and so is included in the text, neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it: it shall be an abhorred thing (Piggul) — Lev. VII, 18: hence he can render the sacrifice Piggul.
(10). ↑ Concerning which the intention is expressed.
(11). ↑ His ruling supra.
(12). ↑ The animal belonged to a heathen, and it is assumed that a heathen tacitly intends his animal to be slaughtered in honor of his deity, which makes it unfit for food. R. Eleazar maintains that it is unfit even though the act of shechitah is performed by a Jew, while the intention is performed by the heathen.
(13). ↑ He found a use for it.
(14). ↑ The passage refers to the Sabbath. V. Shab. 75b, 76a.
(15). ↑ R. Eliezer and R. Simeon b. Eleazar.
(16). ↑ Surely not. ‘Within’ means in the Temple; ‘without’, outside the Temple. Now, R. Eliezer and R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated their views in reference to a heathen and the Sabbath respectively (cases ‘without’ the Temple), and though the law of intention is not written in connection with these at all, they hold that where one man performs an act, another man's intention in reference thereto is effective. Then they will certainly hold the same in reference to sacrifices, where the disqualification of an illegal intention is actually written.
(17). ↑ By the same argument as in the preceding note.
(18). ↑ Surely not. Idolatrous acts of sacrifice involve culpability only when they are of the same nature as the acts performed in true sacrifice (Sanh. 60b). Hence it is natural that in respect to intention too they are similar.
(19). ↑ As in preceding note.
(20). ↑ I.e., culpability is involved only when one performs a real labor, and which he (or people in general) consider as such. Here, however, his action would not normally be considered carrying, and another man's intention cannot make it so.
(21). ↑ Sc. the bullocks brought as sin-offerings when either the whole community or the anointed priest sinned. These were not eaten by the priests but burnt without Jerusalem (Lev. IV, 12, 21; Yoma 68a).
(22). ↑ Sc. the he-goats brought for the sin of idolatry.